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Resumo 
Esta tese tem como objetivo estudar as diferenças nas decisões de 
financiamento entre as empresas exportadoras e não-exportadoras não cotadas 
em Espanha e, também, examinar qual é o impacto da intensidade de exportação 
no nível de endividamento das mesmas empresas. Para isso, usamos uma 
amostra composta por 45 147 empresas, durante o período de 2012 a 2017. 
Após uma revisão detalhada da literatura, foi feita uma análise usando 
diferentes determinantes que, de acordo com a literatura existente, têm impacto 
na estrutura de capital das empresas (e consequentemente nas suas decisões de 
financiamento): Impostos, Tangibilidade, Rentabilidade, Dimensão da Empresa, 
Outros Benefícios Fiscais para além da Dívida, Condições da Indústria, Risco de 
Negócio, Oportunidades de Crescimento, Taxa de Inflação e Intensidade de 
Exportação. 
Os resultados obtidos sugerem que, embora alguns fatores estejam de acordo 
com a literatura existente, tal como o impacto dos Impostos, da Tangibilidade, da 
Rentabilidade, das Condições de Indústria, do Risco de Negócio e da Taxa de 
Inflação; a Dimensão da Empresa e os Outros Benefícios Fiscais para além da 
Dívida apresentam impactos no nível da dívida diferentes dos esperados. Para 
além disso, o único fator cujos resultados diferem das empresas exportadoras 
para as empresas não exportadoras são os Impostos, que apresenta um impacto 
negativo na alavancagem para empresas exportadoras e positivo para com as não 
exportadoras. Finalmente, verifica-se que a Intensidade de Exportação tem uma 
relação positiva com o nível de endividamento. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Decisões de Financiamento, Estrutura de Capital, Exportações, 
Empresas Espanholas Não Cotadas.  
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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the differences in the financing decisions 
between non-listed Spanish export and non-export firms, as well as to examine 
what is the impact of export intensity in firm’s leverage. To do so, we use a 
sample of 45,147 Spanish unlisted firms during the 2012-2017 period. 
After a detailed literature review, an analysis was made using different 
determinants that, according to the extant literature, impact the capital structure 
(and consequently, the financing decisions): Taxes, Tangibility, Profitability, 
Firm Size, Non-Debt Tax Shields, Industry Conditions, Business Risk, Growth 
Opportunities, Inflation Rate and Export Intensity.  
The results obtained suggest that while the impact of some factors are in line 
with the extant literature, namely Taxes, Tangibility, Profitability, Industry 
Conditions, Business Risk and Inflation Rate; the impact of Firm Size and Non-
Debt Tax Shields is different from what we expected. Furthermore, the only 
factor that affects differently both export and non-export firms is Taxes, which 
presents a negative correlation with export firms’ leverage and positive with non-
export firms’ leverage. Finally, the variable Export Intensity shows a positive 
relationship with Leverage.  
 
Keywords: Financing Decisions, Capital Structure, Exportations, Spain Unlisted 
Firms. 
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Introduction  
There are several capital structure theories which attempt to explain the 
proportions of debt and equity that firms choose. However, none of them has 
provide a consensual explanation of how firms finance themselves and their 
projects. 
The pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), which presents the 
capital structure irrelevance theory, triggered many studies about the subject. 
We decided to contribute for the extant literature by examining the financing 
decisions of non-listed Spanish firms, dividing our study into export and non-
export firms, following Silva and Pinto’s (2018) suggestion to extend the study to 
other countries than Portugal. Before Silva and Pinto (2018), there was not any 
study trying to explain the differences between the exporter and non-exporter 
sectors, but now, with both works there is a solid basis to this subject for the 
Iberian Peninsula. Thus, we will search for an answer to the following two 
research questions: (i) What are the differences in the financing decisions 
between non-listed Spanish exporter and non-exporter firms? (ii) What is the 
impact of Export Intensity in the non-listed Spanish firms’ leverage? 
Extant literature points out several theories and determinants that may 
influence firms’ capital structure and, consequently, their financing decisions. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) present the capital structure irrelevance theory, 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) present the trade-off theory, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) present the pecking order theory, Baker and Wurgler (2002) present the 
market timing theory and Jensen and Meckling (1976) present the agency theory. 
Empirical literature present some determinants that are commonly used to 
explain firms’ capital structure, such as: Taxes [Modigliani and Miller (1963)], 
Tangibility [Myers (1977)], Profitability [Myers and Majluf (1984)], Firm Size 
[Titman and Wessels (1988)], Non-Debt Tax Shields [DeAngelo and MAsulis 
(1980)], Industry Conditions [Frank and Goyal (2009)], Business Risk [Bradley et 
18 
 
al. (1984)], Growth Opportunities [Myers (1977)], Inflation Rate 
[Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011)], and Export Intensity [Chen and Yu 
(2011)]. 
Since our focus is on the differences between the export and non-export 
sectors, it is important to emphasize that the existent literature on the subject is 
scanty and provide different results. While Chen and Yu (2011) suggests a 
negative relationship between export intensity and leverage, Silva and Pinto 
(2018) finds a positive relationship regarding exporting firms.  
The conclusions of this study suggest that Tangibility, Profitability, Firm Size 
and Non-Debt Tax Shields affect the debt levels for both export and non-export 
firms in the same way (Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shields affect positively, 
while Profitability and Firm Size affect negatively). In addition, Taxes affects 
negatively leverage in the export firms and positively in the non-export firms, 
and Industry Conditions, Business Risk, Growth Opportunities and Inflation 
Rate are not significant for both type of firms. Finally, Export Intensity, within 
the export firms, affects positively firms’ leverage, as in Silva and Pinto (2018).  
This research gives an important contribution to the literature. First, we study 
a country that is not normally focus by the extant literature, since most of the 
studies focus on US firms. Second, we analyze a sample of unlisted firms, while 
extant literature gives higher importance to the public/listed firms. Finally, this 
study presents results that are not in line with some of the major capital structure 
studies and is important to understand why. 
This work is organized as follows. Chapter 1 presents a general framework of 
Spain’s macroeconomic effects. Chapter 2 presents a literature review regarding 
both capital structure theories and determinants. In Chapter 3 we raise the 
research questions and the research hypothesis that will be tested. Chapter 4 
presents the variables, the sample, and both descriptive statistics and 
methodology used in this study. In Chapter 5 we present the regression results 
19 
 
and some robustness checks, while Chapter 6 presents the main limitations. A 
conclusion closes the study. 
 
 
 
 
  
20 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
1. General Framework 
 
This chapter presents a Spain’s macroeconomic big picture and focus on some 
indicators that might be important to fully understand the concepts that we will 
discuss in the next chapters. All the graphs below correspond to the 2012-2017 
period, which is the basis of this work. 
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1.1. Spain’s GDP 
 
Spain is actually the fourth biggest economy in the Euro Zone and the fifth in 
the European Union. Exports and Imports of goods and sales have an 
important weight on the GDP1, being responsible for 65% of Spain’s GDP. 
Graphic 1 shows that during the 2012 -2017 period the Spain’s GDP grew 
significantly between 2012 to 2015, whith a slightly decrease afterwards.  
 
 
Graph 1 – Spain’s GDP growth rate (in percentage points) in the 2012-2017 period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Gross Domestic Product is defined as an economic indicator that measures a nation’s total 
output of goods and services, during a certain period of time [Tjukanov (2011)]. 
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1.2.  Spain Terms of Trade  
 
As we are studying the export sector, it is important to know if the country is 
accumulating more capital from exports than it is spending in imports. For that 
reason, the graph below shows Spain’s Terms of Trade (TOT2), which is an 
important economic health indicator. However, as changes in the prices may 
impact this indicator, it is also important to analyze the TOT fluctuations to draw 
conclusions. Nevertheless, we can see in Graph 2 that during the 2012-2017 
period, TOT has consistently increased, with the exception of 2017, where this 
indicator slightly decrease. 
 
 
Graph 2 – Spain’s Terms of Trade (in percentage points) in the 2012-2017 period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Terms of Trade is defined by the ratio between export and import prices. It is an indicator 
that measures the country trading efficiency. If the terms of trade figures a higher percentage 
than 100%, means that the country exports are higher value of goods than the country imports, 
then the country is accumulating capital due is trading balance.  
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1.3.  Spain Balance of Trade  
 
A country’s Balance of Trade is the difference between exports and imports 
for a given period of time and is an important part of a nation´s current account. 
If a country exports more than imports, then it works on a trade surplus, 
otherwise it will work on a trade deficit. In graph 3, there are a lot of fluctuations 
during the 2012-2017 period. Spain always work on a trade deficit, however the 
trend is slightly positive, which means that Spain aims to have a lower trade 
deficit in the following years. 
 
 
Graph 3 – Spain’s Balance of Trade (in EUR thousand) in the 2012-2017 period. 
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1.4. Spain Exportations  
 
Export is when a good or service is send from one country to another to sale 
or trade. Exportations expands markets to global customers and boost its 
economies. Besides that, countries with higher value of exportations tends to 
grow faster than those who don’t export, once exports stimulate economic 
growth. Emery (1967) points out that there is a causal relationship between the 
increase in exports and economic growth.  Through the graph 4 analysis, we can 
automatically understand that during the 2012-2017 period, the exports value in 
Spain grew very fast, with lot of fluctuations, but the trend was definitelly 
positive.  
 
 
Graph 4 – Spain’s exports (in EUR thousand) in the 2012-2017 period. 
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1.5. Spain Inflation Rate  
 
Inflation Rate is one of the independent/explanatory variables of our study. 
The inflation rate is a measure of the rate at which the average price of a certain 
basket of goods and services (vary from economy to economy), increases or 
decreases during a certain period of time. This variable will be analyzed more 
deeply in the chapter 2 and 3.  
By the analysis of the graph 5, we can see that at the end of 2012 this rate 
reaches the highest rate of the 2012-217 period with nearly 3,5%. During 2013 and 
2014 there was a decreasing trend of the inflation rate, being negative during 
almost whole 2014. This rate keep negative during 2015 and until middle of 2016. 
After that, there was always a positive inflation rate until the end of 2017. 
 
 
Graph 5 – Spain’s Inflation Rate (in percentage points) in the 2012-2017 period.  
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Chapter 2  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Capital Structure Theories  
 
Capital Structure is one of the main topics of corporate finance and is probably 
the one which causes more discussion when we look to the literature.  
Capital Structure theories attempt to explain the right proportions of debt and 
equity that a firm should have. Donaldson (1952) was the first study related to 
capital structure, however Modigliani and Miller (1958) is considered the pioneer 
study in this matter, where the authors defend the capital structure irrelevance 
theory. This study triggered many works on the subject, such as [Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973), Bradley et al. (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Frank and Goyal (2009)], among others.  
There are a lot of theories, mainly trade-off and pecking order theories, and a 
lot of authors discussing different type of theories involving capital structure, 
however, until now, none of them provide a solid theoretical basis that can 
explain the financing decisions used by firms.  
During this chapter, some of the main Capital Structure theories will be 
reviewed in order to give a comprehensive and concise approach of this major 
theme. 
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2.1.1. Traditional View and Irrelevance Theory  
 
Durand (1952) was the first author that discussed this issue, arguing that it is 
possible to achieve an optimal capital structure, which maximizes firm value. The 
author points out two different approaches to measure the Capital Structure 
impact on the firm’s value. 
The first is the Net Operating Income Method, where the firm’s value is not 
affected by the change in capital structure, because it undertakes the fact that a 
possible advantage that the firm can take from the use of debt is offset by the 
simultaneous increase in the bankruptcy risks that the firm may face. This 
annulment of benefits happens because the increase in the percentage of debt that 
a company holds, will lead to a higher risk of bankruptcy and such risk will, 
consequently, increase the risk perception of the shareholders who will demand 
a higher rate of return. 
The second one is the Net Income Method, by which the firm’s value can 
increase by increasing the amount of debt. A firm should increase the weight of 
debt until it reaches the minimum possible WACC that the firm can achieve, and 
that point would be the maximization of the firm value.  
The Net Income Method is in line with the traditional approach which defends 
that a firm must aim an optimal capital structure that minimizes the financing 
costs and maximizes the firm value.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) contest Durand (1952) approach by presenting 
the capital structure irrelevance theory. Assuming that there are no transaction 
costs, no bankruptcy costs, no taxes, no asymmetry information problems, no 
agency costs and no arbitrage opportunities, they developed to propositions. 
According to Proposition I, which is the one that implies the irrelevant argument, 
firms in the same type of business will have the same value. Therefore, the debt 
and equity proportion will not change the firm value. According to Proposition 
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II, the WACC is not influenced by the proportion of debt and equity that a firm 
have and is constant, which go against the Net Income Method proposed by 
Durand (1952).  
Durand (1959) argues that Modigliani and Miller (1958) have jumped out of 
realism by overstep many assumptions. The author also says that Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) analyzed the risks in a very slight way and have painted the world 
as a remarkably safe one (without any type of risks). 
Stiglitz (1969) points out an error in the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) work. 
According to Stiglitz (1969), it is not possible to ignore the default risks, once the 
bond yield increases with firm’s leverage. Similarly, Scott (1976) asserts that the 
theory does not refer the dangerous effect of the unmeasured debt.  
Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) paper aims to correct an existent error on their 
previous paper. As mentioned by the authors, “The purpose of this communication 
is to correct an error in our paper "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment" (this Review, June 1958)”. The authors add corporate taxes to 
their model and come out with the conclusion that the firm’s value actually 
increases when leverage increases.  
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) relaxed the Modgliani and Miller’s (1958) 
model by adding bankruptcy costs. The authors argue that there is an optimal 
capital structure, which will origin the trade-off theory. 
 
 
2.1.2. Trade-off Theory  
 
As Modigliani and Miller (1963) point out, taxes’ advantages are in fact 
important and will have a huge impact on further studies. According to the 
authors, the proportion of debt is not related to the firm’s value, yet the authors 
predict that the increase of the leverage will increase the firm’s value. 
30 
 
Baxter (1967) intends to explain “in the context of the Modigliani and Miller 
discussion, how excessive leverage can be expected to raise the cost of capital to the firm”. 
The author argues that a firm which relies too much on debt, will increase its cost 
of capital. According to the author, there are a lot of costs associated with 
bankruptcy, and for that reason, other things equal, excess leverage might reduce 
the value of the firm. However, the existence of corporate taxes, which treats 
interest as tax deductible, suggests that leverage tend to decrease the cost of 
capital. In sum, according to Baxter (1967), too much leverage will increase the 
cost of capital, however the existence of corporate taxes will mitigate the effect. 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) came out with the conclusion that since 
corporate taxes are tax deductible, a firm will only finance itself with debt in 
order to capture those tax advantages, although a firm should be able to pay its 
debt obligations, or it will face bankruptcy penalties. Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973) argue that the taxation of corporate profits and the bankruptcy costs3 are 
core market imperfections that must be considered in the theory of the effect of 
leverage on the firm’s market value. Thus, the optimal capital structure is the one 
where the level of debt maximizes the firm market value without lead to 
bankruptcy.   
Kim (1978) says that the traditional presumption that the firm’s value is a 
concave function of its leverage and when the slope of the that function is zero, 
that’s where the firm’s value is maximized. According to Kim (1978), in perfect 
markets where there are bankruptcy costs and income taxes, the optimal level of 
debt of a firm is less than their debt capacities. The firm’s market value increases 
for low levels of debt and decreases when those firms rely too much on debt 
financing.   
Bradley et al. (1984) develop a model where they include personal taxes, 
expected costs of financial distress4  and positive non-debt tax shield. They state 
                                               
3 Warner (1977) distinguish direct bankruptcy costs from indirect bankruptcy costs. 
4 Bankruptcy costs (see Warner 1977) and agency costs.  
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that an optimal firm capital structure is inversely related to expected costs of 
financial distress and non-debt tax shields.  
Myers (1984) argue that an increase in the firm’s debt will lead to a risk 
increase and consequently will lead to an increase of the bankruptcy costs. 
However, this is balanced by the debt tax-shields. For this same reason, the 
author believe that is possible to balance a relationship between cost and benefit 
in order to achieve an optimal capital structure that maximizes the firm’s value. 
The author complements this idea in Myers (2001), by saying that firms increase 
their leverage until the point where the benefits of having higher levels of debt 
equal the possible bankruptcy and agency costs. 
Static trade-off theory can be thus summarized as the perfect balance between 
debt and equity, under the assumption that a firm’s debt payments are tax 
deductible. This happens because a firm can have a lower WACC when finances 
itself through debt, however increasing the amount of debt also increases the 
bankruptcy costs. 
Although there are a lot of studies that prove the importance of the Trade-off 
theory, there are other studies that prove that this theory is not the only one that 
is relevant regarding capital structure financing decisions. Fama and French 
(2002), point out that some relations are according to the trade-off theory (firms 
with more non-debt tax shields have less leverage) and some other relations are 
in line with the pecking order theory (more profitable firms has less leverage). 
 
 
2.1.3. Pecking-order Theory and Asymmetric 
information  
 
Donaldson (1961) was the first author who states that there was a pecking 
order of internal over external financial. The author studied some patterns of 
large firms and observe that the firms prioritize internal financing. 
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Later, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), states that financing 
decisions follow an order of preference and firm’s prefer internal financing over 
external financing, due to the asymmetric information and also the signaling 
problems that could arrive with external financing. The authors defend that if a 
firm does not have enough internal funds, it should finance through debt, 
depending of the costs of each source. However, a firm should always avoid to 
finance through external equities in order to prevent the firm’s control dilution. 
According to Holmes and Kent (1991), “Owner/managers are strongly adverse to any 
dilution of their ownership interest and control” Holmes and Kent (1991).  
In this theory there is not an optimal capital structure and each firm will 
choose the debt-equity ratio that perform better under the firm’s circumstances. 
Myers (1984) adds that a firm’s debt-equity ratio will reflect the firm external 
financing necessities. According to Myers (1984), a firm prefers to use retained 
earnings instead of finance itself by debt. Debt financing only occurs when a firm 
do not possess enough retained earnings. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test the traditional capital structure approach 
against the pecking order model and they conclude that the pecking order model, 
which predicts that internal financial deficit is the main force that lead to an 
external financing, has much more explanatory power than a static trade-off 
model, which predicts that a firm adjust its capital structure in order to achieve 
an optimal debt-equity ratio. The authors, instead of study all the hypothesis 
together, like Titman and Wessels (1988) have made, they studied the theories as 
contending hypothesis and examined their explanatory power. Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) add that the strong performance of the pecking order model 
does not rely only on the unanticipated cash needs with debt by the firms, 
because indeed, according to their studies, firms plan to cover anticipated deficits 
with debt. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) tested the model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
because the authors argued that the studied sample was too small (157 firms over 
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1971-1989 period), and they come out with the conclusion that the pecking order 
model does not work very well for smaller firms. However, the pecking order 
theory seems the one which explains better the capital structure as the firm sizes 
increase.  
Lemmon and Zender (2010) study show that controlling the heterogeneity in 
debt across firms, pecking order theory describe perfectly the financing behavior 
of a firm.  
Information asymmetries are very important when we are studying firm’s 
capital structure. Leland and Pyle (1977) notice that a lot of markets suffer from 
informational differences between the sellers and the buyers and in the financial 
markets, this information asymmetries are abundant. By applying this, Leland 
and Pyle (1977) state that in the real world, there are a lot of asymmetries between 
managers and shareholders. There are a lot of more information in the managers 
side, and for that reason, they can manipulate the shareholders by hide 
information for them.  
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), once the investors are not fully 
informed as the firm insiders, equity may be mispriced by the market. This 
underpricing may be so severe, that can result in a net loss to the existing 
shareholders. 
 
2.1.4. Market Timing theory  
 
According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), market timing theory is defined by as 
“capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcomes of past attempts to time the equity 
market”.  They argue that there are two versions of equity market timing, being 
the first one a dynamic form studied by Myers and Majluf (1984), with rational 
managers and investors and also adverse selection costs. The second has 
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irrational investors and perceptions of mispricing5 and suggest that firms prefer 
to issue debt when the relative cost of equity is high and equity when is low.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that when the market value is high, firms with 
low leverage levels tend to raise funds by selling their securities, however when 
the market value is low, the high leverage firm are the ones who raise funds by 
selling securities. Also, according to the authors, there is a negative relation 
between leverage and historical market valuations. 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), the basic idea of this theory is to look 
and understand both debt and equity market conditions. After that, if they need 
any financing, they will use the most favorable one. If none seems good to them, 
they will pass the financing need. Furthermore, if they do not need to finance but 
there is a funding source that is unusually favorable, this source will be used. 
 
2.1.5. Agency theory  
 
Following Ross (1973), the agency costs6 theory is based on the relationship 
between two (or more) parties, when one (the agent) acts on behalf of the other 
(the principal), in a particular domain of decision making. All the contracts 
between two parties contain important elements of agency.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that, if both parties are utility 
maximizers, the agent will not act on behalf of the principal every time. However, 
the principal can align the agent interests by establishing appropriate incentives. 
Nevertheless, there will be always some divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and the perfect decisions in the viewpoint of the principal, given the 
impossibility of writing complete contracts [Myers (2001)].  
                                               
5 Equity is issued when managers believe its cost is irrationally low and repurchase it when 
they think its cost is irrationally high. 
6 Agency costs are costs that arise from inefficiency and disruption within a company and are 
related with conflict of interest and governance. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) also states that agency costs can be sum up 
into the following three factors: (i) monitoring costs7 by the principal; (ii) the 
bonding expenditures by the agent; (iii) and the residual loss8. The authors 
identify two major types of conflicts that agency costs may arise: conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders. 
Jensen and Mecking (1976) described the costs that conflicts between 
managers and shareholders would bring to a firm. To do so, the authors compare 
the manager’s behavior when he owns 100% of his firm and when he sells part of 
firm’s shares to an outsider. When the manager owns 100% of the shares, he will 
make operation decisions that maximize the firm’s utility9. On the other hand, 
when the manager sells part of his shares, he will stop trying to maximize firm’s 
utility and will try to maximize his own utility, which will put the firm’s welfare 
in risk. According to Jensen (1986), another conflict between managers and 
shareholders is related with the pay-out, since when there is conflicts between 
managers and shareholders, managers will prefer to invest excess cash-flow in 
negative NPV projects rather than see that money being distributed to the 
shareholders. However, Jensen (1986) says that it would be preferred that firm’s 
use debt as a response to the agency costs. But why? According to the author, 
financing through debt would obligate the managers to pay-out cash to its 
debtholders, otherwise the firm would face bankruptcy. This would ensure that 
the managers act in the best benefit to the firms. 
 Conflicts between shareholders and debt holders are another type of 
conflicts that may arise from agency costs. Myers (2001) state that they only 
happen when a firm face default risk. Debtholders have no interest in the firm’s 
                                               
7 Not only observe the agent, but also effort in order to restrain the agent´s budget or 
compensation policies. 
8 Cost of the agency relationship. 
9 Involves all utility aspects of a firm, such as physical appointments, attractiveness of the staff, 
employee discipline, charitable contributions, personal relations with employees. 
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income or value when a firm it is free from default risk. Since equity is a residual 
claim10 when a firm faces a possible bankruptcy, shareholders will try to decrease 
the value of the existing debt. Supposing that a firm is facing a significative 
default risk and the managers act in accordance with the shareholders, they will 
try to trade value from firm’s creditors to firm’s shareholders Myers (2001). 
Managers can shift their low-risk investments into high-risk investments, 
because on doing so, higher return could be captured by the shareholders, while 
a possible downside will be absorbed by the creditors. According to Myers (2001), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the firsts to stresses risk-shifting as an agency 
problem. Borrow and pay-out cash to stockholders will also trade value, since the 
overall firm value will remain constant, but the debt value will decrease. This 
will lower the value of the shares, however the cash received will offset this loss 
[Myers (2001)]. 
 
2.2. Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
Extant capital structure literature, like Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), Chen and Yu (2011), 
among others, present some factors that may influence firm’s leverage, such as: 
Taxes, Nature of Assets, Profitability, Firm Size, Growth Opportunities, Non-
Debt Tax Shields, Industry Conditions, Business Risk, Growth Opportunities, 
Inflation Rate and Export Intensity. Analyze those factors is very important to 
understand how can they influence and why they influence the firm’s financial 
decisions, in certain conditions.   
 
 
                                               
10 Equity claim is the right that the shareholder has to the firm’s profit, after all the obligations 
have been paid. 
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2.2.1. Taxes  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) developed the model presented in their paper of 
1958 by adding the tax effect. After the inclusion of the tax effect, the authors 
conclude not only that firm’s value depends on leverage, but also that a firm’s 
value increase due to the tax benefits generated by leverage. 
Baxter (1967) argues that the existence of corporate taxes, which treats interest 
as tax deductible, leads to the conclusion that leverage tend to decrease the cost 
of capital. On doing so, the existence of corporate taxes will create an optimal 
capital structure by balancing the costs of bankruptcy11 with the benefits from 
corporate taxes. In the same line of reasoning, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
assert that a firm should finance itself through debt in order to capture tax 
advantages, since taxes are deductible.  
 
2.2.2. Nature of Assets – Tangibility  
 
Myers (1977) suggests that for a firm which has no assets to give as a collateral, 
creditors will have to require more favorable conditions that the firm is not 
willing to accept. Hence, firms under these conditions, should prefer issuing 
equity rather than debt.   
In line with Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984) shows that the absence of 
tangible assets is deeply related to the information asymmetry, because a firm 
with less tangible assets has less collaterals to give to creditors. As tangible assets 
are viewed by the creditors as collaterals, firms with more tangible assets can rely 
more on debt since they can provide guarantees towards the debtholders. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) also state that the agency problem is reduced by firms that 
                                               
11 Bankruptcy costs are positively related to leverage; higher debt levels will lead to higher 
bankruptcy costs. 
38 
 
have more tangible assets, which provides them easily access to debt. For this 
reason, both studies draw that the relation between tangibility and leverage is 
positive. 
Similarly, Harris and Raviv (1991) asserts that firms with comparatively less 
tangible assets will face more information asymmetries and, therefore, will face 
higher underinvestment problems.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) provide a study that aims to examine if the factors 
that were proven to be correlated with leverage for the United States firms are 
the same in the other countries, more precisely, in the G-7 countries12. As the 
previous authors stated, tangible assets are easy to collateralize13 and for that 
reason they reduce the agency costs of debt. This study proves that tangibility14 
increase book leverage of all the countries by approximately 20% of its standard 
deviation, with the exception of Japan with a level of 45%. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) divide assets in two major categories, tangible assets 
(property, plant and equipment) and intangible assets (goodwill, for example) 
and state that firms with more tangible assets are easier to evaluate and face less 
expected distress costs. So, the level of asset tangibility as well as the composition 
of those assets are very important in a firm’s capital structure.  
However, Frank and Goyal (2009) argues that under the pecking order theory 
a negative relationship should be found. Low asymmetry information associated 
with tangible assets, will induce firms to issue equity, so a firm with more 
tangible assets will have lower leverage ratios. However, there is some ambiguity 
                                               
12 Founded in 1975, Germany, Canada, United States, France, Italy, Japan and United Kingdom 
are the group of countries that form the G-7. 
13 Similarly to Rajan and Zingales (1995), Berger and Udell (1994) show that firms with close 
relationships to the creditors, need to provide less collateral. 
14 According to Rajan and Zingales (1995) tangibility is measure by the ratio fixed to total 
assets. 
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under the pecking order theory. If there is adverse selection15 about the firms, 
when tangibility increases the adverse selection will lead to a higher leverage.  
 
2.2.3. Profitability 
 
When we flick through the existent literature and focus on profitability, we 
can notice that this is a determinant that is in line with the pecking order theory. 
The overall results of the literature show that higher profitable firms tent to 
borrow less, since they will utilize internal-generated funds instead of seeking 
debt financing.  
According to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), it is possible to 
observe a negative correlation between profitability and leverage, however, the 
simple explanation about this relationship resumes to the fact the equity is costly 
than debt, and for that reason, most profitable firms, which have internally-
generated funds, tend to rely less on debt.  
Jensen (1986) shows two different ways to see profitability. In the first one, 
there would be a positive relationship between profitability and leverage, but this 
only happens when there is an efficient corporate control. This corporate control 
will force the firm to pay out cash when leverage increases. On the other hand, if 
there is not an efficient corporate control, firms will present negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage, once they will try to stay away from the 
corrective role of debt.  
Titman and Wessels (1988), in line with Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) results, state that past profitability of a firm, and consequently the retained 
earnings available, have an important impact on the capital structure. 
                                               
15 When sellers have information that buyers do not have about some aspect of the product 
and will then lead to asymmetric information. 
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According to Rajan and Zingales (1995) profitability has a negative impact on 
firm’s leverage. The authors noted that larger firms tend to issue less equity and 
the negative impact that profitability has on leverage becomes higher as the firm 
sizes increases. Similar results are presented in Harris and Raviv (1991) and 
Frank and Goyal (2009). 
 
2.2.4. Firm Size 
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) find evidence in the literature that larger firms tend 
to rely more on debt16. The author also finds evidence in the literature17, that 
relates the cost of issuing equity securities and debt with firm size. Small firms 
pay much more than large firms when issuing new equity and long-term debt, 
and for that reason, smaller firms may issue short-short term debt and become 
higher leveraged. This thinking is in line with the pecking order theory. 
Bradley et al. (1984), Long and Malitz (1985) and Titman and Wessels (1988), 
also state that larger firms tend to have a larger debt-equity ratio than smaller 
firms. March (1982) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), also find that higher firms 
tend to rely more on debt. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) reaches the same conclusion by saying that larger and 
more diversified firms face lower default risks and older firms face less debt-
related agency costs. Therefore, firms which are larger and more mature tend to 
have higher leverage levels.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 The author points Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) as providers of such evidence. 
17 Smith (1977). 
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2.2.5. Non-Debt Tax Shields  
 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) point out that non-debt tax shields, as tax 
deductions for depreciations and investment tax credits, can be considered 
substitutes of the benefits which derive from debt financing. Authors also show 
that the relation between non-debt tax shields and firm’s leverage is negative.  
On the contrary, Bradley et al. (1984) find a significant positive relationship 
between leverage and the level of non-debt tax shields. As pointed out by the 
authors, “the sign of the coefficient on non-debt tax shields is perverse” Bradley et al. 
(1984).  
Titman and Wessels (1988) could not confirm the significance of the relation 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage. 
In order to take benefits of higher tax-shields, firms will issue more debt when 
the tax rates are higher, which will lead to a negative correlation between 
nondebt tax shields and leverage [Frank and Goyal (2009)]. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) reaches the same conclusion. 
 
2.2.6. Industry Conditions  
 
The Trade-Off theory predicts that higher industry median leverage should 
result in more leverage. Managers tend to use industry median leverage as a 
benchmark when they reflect about capital structure [Hovakimian et al. (2001) 
and Flannery and Ragan (2006)]. This means that industry median leverage is 
frequently used as a proxy for capital structure – firms adjust their debt to meet 
industry median leverage. 
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Frank and Goyal (2009), expect the same results. Authors reveal that industry 
effects have correlated factors18, because firms in the same industry tend to face 
similar factors, like product market interactions or even competition19. 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), there are two variables that can be 
related to industry conditions: industry median growth and industry median 
leverage. Following the trade-off theory, higher industry median growth should 
result in less debt, while higher industry median leverage should result in higher 
leverage.  Under the pecking order theory, industry only matter if their 
valuations are correlated across firms in an industry. 
 
2.2.7. Business Risk  
 
Volatility of firm earnings is used as a proxy for Business Risk. Bradley et al. 
(1984) model predicts a negative relationship between earnings volatility and 
firm’s leverage. Myers (1984) supports Bradley et al. (1984) prediction.  
According to the trade-off theory, a firm with higher earnings volatility should 
have higher expected costs of financial distress and for that reason should have 
lower leverage [Frank and Goyal (2009)]. Frank and Goyal (2009) also stress that 
a firm with more volatile earnings or cash flows, will have reduced probability 
off having fully utilized tax shields, which leads to the conclusion that higher risk 
means less debt. Volatility is also linked to adverse selection. Therefore, under 
the pecking order theory, riskier firms have higher leverage.  
 
 
 
                                               
18 Hovakimian et al. (2004) also follow this interpretation and included industry leverage in 
their model in order to control for omitted factors. 
19 See Brander and Lewis (1986) and Chevalier (1995). 
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2.2.8. Growth Opportunities  
 
Myers (1977) find that profitable investment opportunities are usually 
discarded by most profitable firms. Rajan and Zingales (1995) say that firms that 
expect high future growth should finance themselves by issuing equity rather 
than debt when they want to finance their investments. This is in line with Myers 
(1977), who says that when a firm is financed with risky debt, may pass up 
valuable investment opportunities.  
Several authors [Myers (1977), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009)] support that under the trade-off theory, 
growth opportunities will reduce the debt-equity ratio.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) did not find any reliable relation between leverage 
and growth opportunities. 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), under the pecking order theory, firms 
with more investments accumulate more debt which leads to a positive relation 
between growth opportunities and debt. 
 
2.2.9. Inflation Rate  
 
Frank and Goyal (2009) following Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), argues that not 
only the firm-related determinants have impact on the capital structure choices. 
Macroeconomic factors significantly impact firm’ s financing decisions. For 
example, during an expansion, stock prices usually go up and expected 
bankruptcy costs go down, which leads to higher borrow levels.  
Agency costs, during an expansion, are likely to increase, since the managers 
see their wealth being reduced comparatively to shareholders’. However, if debt 
aligns both incentives (managers and shareholders), we should see a negative 
relationship between economic cycles and levels of borrow. According to the 
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pecking order theory, if during expansion periods the internal funds available 
are higher, firm should borrow less. 
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) present a study that aims to deeply 
understand firm’s capital structure by examining both characteristics of the firm 
and its institutional environment. In terms of firm’s determinants, the author 
results are in line with both trade-off and pecking order theories. 
In contrast with Frank and Goyal (2009), Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) 
find a negative relation between inflation rate and leverage. 
 
2.2.10. Exportations  
 
According to Minetti and Zhu (2011), exporting involves a lot of initial costs 
and a lot of prior information in order to be successful. Das et al. (2007) assert 
that due to the high entry costs, which must be paid up-front, only firms with 
high liquidity will be able to start to export. Minetti and Zhu (2011) present 
results that prove that the probability of exporting is higher for firms with higher 
debt-equity ratios and lower cash flow20. 
Chen and Yu (2011), using 566 Taiwanese firms, suggest that the relation 
between export intensity and leverage is negative. This relation arises from the 
fact that exporter firms tend to rely more on internal funds than on external 
financing due to the monitoring problem. According to the authors, when firms 
expand their operations to foreign countries, it is harder for the creditors to 
monitor selling activities due to its complexity. For that reason, the agency costs 
increase, mainly if these selling operations are on emerging economies with poor 
corporate governance. This will make debtholders les motivated to lend 
additional funds. 
                                               
20 According to the author, the leverage effect could suggest that firms may use exports as a 
way to shift the risk, associated with their high debt, to creditors. 
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Silva and Pinto (2018), using a sample of 43,078 Portuguese firms, find that 
export firms have a higher leverage level than non-export firms and also that 
among export firms, firms with higher export intensity tend to have more debt.  
The literature related to exports is very scant and this is one of the main 
reasons that lead us to examine the impact of export intensity in capital structure 
and making a comparative analysis between non-listed Spanish exporter and 
non-exporter firms.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Research Questions and Hypothesis  
3.1. Research Questions  
 
The literature review allow to build the correct framework and formulate ten 
research questions. Our main objective is to investigate the differences between 
non-listed Spanish exporter and non-exporter firms financing decisions. 
On doing so, we formulate the following two research questions: (i) What are 
the differences in the financing decisions between non-listed Spanish exporter 
and non-exporter firms? (ii) What is the impact of Export Intensity in the non-
listed Spanish firms’ leverage? 
 
3.2. Research hypotheses 
 
In this section, based on the determinants of firms’ leverage discussed in the 
section 2.2, we formulate research hypothesis. Furthermore, we will identify the 
proxy used, following the extant literature. Note that, we use a lot of proxies due 
to the difficulty of finding, in the Spanish accounting, the same items that the 
authors use in order to calculate the determinants.   
 
3.2.1. Taxes 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that the value of a firm is not only 
dependent from its financing decisions, but also that tax benefits increase when 
firms rely more on debt. This suggests a positive relationship between corporate 
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taxes and leverage, which is supported by Baxter (1967), Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973) and Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011). 
As in Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), we use the ratio between Taxes 
on Profits and Profits and Losses before Tax as a proxy for Taxes.  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between corporate taxes and leverage. 
 
3.2.2. Tangibility 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms with less 
tangible assets is suffer more from information asymmetries. Therefore, firms 
with more tangible assets can rely more on debt, which can be used as collateral 
[Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Frank and Goyal (2009)].  
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), we use the ratio between Fixed 
Tangible Assets and Total Assets to calculate firm’s tangibility.  
 
H2: Firms with more tangible assets have higher leverage.  
 
3.2.3. Profitability  
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), there is a negative relationship between 
profitability and the debt-equity ratio. Frank and Goyal (2009) also find a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage, as well as Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). This expected relation is in line with the pecking order theory, 
since firms that are more profitable tend to finance themselves through internally 
generated funds.  
As in Frank and Goyal (2009), the ratio between EBITDA and Total Assets is 
used as a proxy for firm´s profitability. 
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H3: There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
  
3.2.4. Firm Size  
According to Titman and Wessels (1988), the relation between firm size 
and leverage is positive. Harris and Raviv (1995) in line with Bradley et al. (1984) 
and Long and Malitz (1985) also state that larger firms rely more on debt. Frank 
and Goyal (2009) find evidence that larger and mature firms rely more on debt, 
since they face lower default risks and agency costs.  
As in Rajan and Zingales (1995), we use logarithm of Total Assets as a 
proxy for firm size.  
 
H4: Larger firms tend to rely more on debt. 
 
3.2.5. Non-Debt Tax Shields 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) point that non-debt tax shields can be 
considered substitutes of the benefits that derives from debt financing, and state 
that the relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage is negative. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal (2009) reach the same conclusion.  
As in Leary and Roberts (2005), we use the ratio between Depreciation and 
Total Assets as a proxy for Non-Debt Tax Shields.  
 
H5: Firms with higher non-debt tax shields have less leverage. 
 
3.2.6. Industry Conditions 
Trade off theory predicts that higher industry median leverage should 
result in more leverage. Industry median leverage is usually used by the authors 
as a capital structure benchmark [Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Flannery and 
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Ragan (2006)]. According to Frank and Goyal (2009), higher industry median 
leverage should result in higher leverage.  
As in Frank and Goyal (2009), we use unadjusted Median Industry 
Leverage as a proxy for industry conditions.  
 
H6: There is a positive relation between Industry Leverage and firm’s 
leverage.  
 
3.2.7. Business Risk  
Bradley et al. (1984) predicts a negative relationship between earnings 
volatility (used as proxy for business risk) and leverage, which is corroborated 
by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Frank and Goyal (2009) also expect 
a negative relationship, since a firm with higher earnings volatility have higher 
probability of financial distress costs, which may lead to lower debt levels. 
We use the ratio between Enterprise Value and EBIT as a proxy for business 
risk.  
 
H7: There is a negative relation between Business Risk and firm’s leverage. 
  
3.2.8. Growth Opportunities  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that firms with higher future growth 
opportunities should obtain funding by issuing equity. Hence, firms with higher 
growth opportunities will have less debt levels. This is in line with Myers (1977), 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009). 
Fama and French (2002) add that a firm with high growth opportunities tend to 
use the retained internal cash flow in investment opportunities, which leads to 
small levels of debt. 
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As in Frank and Goyal (2009), we use the ratio between CAPEX and Total 
Assets as proxy for growth opportunities. 
 
H8: Firms with higher growth opportunities will have less debt levels.  
 
3.2.9. Inflation Rate  
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) find a negative relation between 
inflation rate and leverage. This result is in contrast with Frank and Goyal (2009) 
that find a positive relation; however, the authors expect that inflation should be 
the least reliable factor in their study. For this reason, the negative relation found 
by Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), will be our expected relation.  
We use the Annual Inflation Rate as Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), to 
calculate this determinant. 
 
H9: There is a negative relationship between the annual inflation rate and 
leverage. 
 
3.2.10. Exports  
According to Chen and Yu (2011), firms with higher export intensity tend to 
have lower debt levels.  
We will use the Percentage of Export Intensity as proxy for export intensity. 
 
H10: There is a negative relation between export intensity and leverage. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4. Variables, Sample, Descriptive Statistics and 
Methodology 
4.1. Variables 
 
Variable Measure Expected impact 
Taxes 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥
 + 
Tangibility 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 + 
Profitability 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 - 
Firm Size Log(total assets) + 
Non-Debt Tax Shields 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 - 
Industry Conditions Median Market D/E  
(unadjusted) 
+ 
Business Risk 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
 - 
Growth Opportunities 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋21
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
- 
Inflation Rate Annual Inflation Rate  - 
Export Intensity % of Exportation for each 
firm 
- 
Table 1 - Summary of the variables, their measures and their expected impact on the Leverage. 
                                               
21 CAPEX is computed as fixed tangible and intangible assets for year t, less fixed tangible and 
intangible assets for t-1, plus amortization for year t. 
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4.2. Sample 
In order to study and compare the Spanish non-listed firm’s financing 
decisions for the 2012-2017 period, we selected a restricted sample of 45,147 firms 
(of the 1 618 332 non-listed firms that exists in Spain22). The main reason of the 
decision of using only this amount of firms was that a lot of non-listed firms does 
not provide all the information to the database and a lot of data needed for the 
research was not available for the smallest companies. For that reason, we used 
a filter (all the companies must have in each of the 6 years of study, a value of 
total assets higher than 3.000.000€) in order to examine a more homogenous 
group of companies.    
All the firm’s data used in this study were extracted from SABI Database. 
Additionally, the information for the variables Industry Conditions and Business 
Risk was taken from the DAMODARAN Website23, which provides the metrics 
and the information for Industry’s means. We hand-matched firms with 
industries by using Industry SIC Code24. 
Since we studied 45,147 firms for 6 years, we apply a panel data sample. We 
used the SIC Code to separate our sample by 18 different industries. Table 2 
shows three columns, where the first gives the SIC Code, the second presents the 
industry category and the third has a code that we will use further on as Industry 
Fixed-Effects in our models.  
 
 
                                               
22 According to SABI database at 29th of December 2018. 
23 Damodaran Website is an online site, created by Aswath Damodaran who is a teacher of 
corporate finance and valuation at the Stern School of Business at New York University, that 
among other things, provide to the user information about corporate finance and valuation 
metrics on industry averages. 
24 SIC Code, Standard Industrial Classification Code, it is a four-digit number created by the 
United States in order to facilitate the collection, presentation and the analysis of data. This code 
identifies the core business of any firm and covers all the economic activities. 
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Sic Code Industrial Categories IC 
 1. Commercial and Industrial  
<=999 1.1.  Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  1 
>=4812 & <=4899 1.2.  Communications  2 
>=1520 & <=1999 1.3.  Construction/Heavy Engineer  3 
 1.4.  Manufactoring  
>=2800 & <=3099 1.1.1. Chemicals, plastic and rubber  4 
>=2000 & <=2099 1.1.2. Food and Beverages 5 
>=3510 & <=3872 1.1.3. Machinery and Equipments  6 
>=3310 & <=3499 1.1.4. Steel, Aluminum and Other Metals  7 
>=2100 & <=2799 
>=3100 & <=3299 
>=3873 & <=4010 
 
1.1.5. Other 
 
8 
>=1000 & <=1310 
>=1400 & <=1519 
1.5.  Mining and Natural Resources 9 
>=1311 & <=1389 1.6.  Oil and Gas 10 
>=6500 & <=6999 1.7.  Real Estate  11 
>=5200 & <=5999 1.8.  Retail Trade 12 
>=7000 & <=8879 1.9.  Services 13 
>=5000 & <=5199          1.10. Wholesale Trade 14 
>=4900 & <=4999 2. Utilities 15 
>=6000 & <=6499       3. Financial Institutions   16 
>=4011 & <=4811 4. Transportation 17 
>=8888 & <=9729 5. Pubic Administration/Government  18 
Table 2 - Industry categories, corresponding SIC code and its industry code. 
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4.3.  Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable Leverage 
and for the explanatory variables Export Intensity, Taxes, Tangibility, 
Profitability, Firm Size, Non-Debt Tax Shields, Industry Conditions, Business 
Risk and Inflation Rate. 
From now on the variable Growth Opportunities will not be part of our model 
since it reduces in a very significant way the number of observations. Besides 
that, all the statistics in the Table 3 must be read and analyzed as percentages, 
except the variables Firm Size, Business Risk and Inflation Rate. 
 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Max  Min 
Lev  135 105 0,278 0,239 0,240 6,248 0,000 
Export Intensity  135 105 0,071 0 0,193 1 0 
Taxes 135 105 71,944 0,249 26377,830 9695600 -1479,714 
Tangibility 135 105 0,301 0,216 0,286 1,073 -0,100 
Profitability  135 105 0,061 0,040 0,092 3,299 -8,548 
Firm Size  135 105 4,066 3,916 0,495 7,953 3,477 
Growth Opportunities 75 968 -0,031 -0,023 0,086 0,985 -3,038 
Non-Debt Tax Shields  135 105 0,026 0,017 0,028 0,887 0,000 
Industry Conditions  135 105 0,552 0,386 0,445 5,816 0,159 
Business Risk  135 105 18,984 17,140 5,235 93,732 7,677 
Inflation Rate  135 105 0,008 0,014 0,012 0,025 -0,005 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics before interval limitations 
 
As present in the Table 3, there are some irregular/abnormal values (for 
example, the Taxes maximum is 9695600%). So, we create some intervals of 
values that the variables can assume, in order to overcome this possible problem. 
The intervals are presented in the Table 4. 
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Variable Intervals of values  
Leverage  Following Kayhan and Titman (2007) we drop the 
leverage values which were higher than 1. 
Export Intensity  This variable is already well defined, since the values 
were directly collected from SABI Database and the 
values can vary from 0% to 100%. 
Taxes In agreement with Frank and Goyal (2003), we have 
trimmed this variable at top and bottom 1% percentiles. 
Tangibility  It is impossible that the value of tangible assets is higher 
than the total assets, so we will trim our tangibility 
values outside the interval [0; 1], to eliminate abnormal 
values. 
Profitability  In agreement with Frank and Goyal (2003) we have 
trimmed this variable at top and bottom 1% percentiles. 
Growth  It is not normal a firm having a CAPEX value higher 
than its Total Assets, so all the observations must be in 
the interval [-1; 1]. 
Firm Size  This variable is already well defined, since it is a 
logarithm value. 
Non-Debt Tax Shield  It is not normal to see the value of Depreciations higher 
than the Total Assets value, therefore the interval will be 
[0; 1]. 
Industry Conditions  This variable was collected from the DAMODARAN 
database. It is the annual Median Leverage average of 
each industry and does not have abnormal values. 
Business Risk   This variable was collected from the DAMODARAN 
database. It is the annual EBIT Multiple average of each 
industry and does not have abnormal values. 
Inflation Rate  This variable is already well defined, since the values 
were calculated through the World Bank Group. 
Table 4 - Definition of values’ intervals that the variables can assume. 
 
After the definition of these intervals, we reached our final table of descriptive 
statistics (Table 5) that contain information about the Mean, Median, Standard 
Deviation, Maximum and Minimum of each of our variables. Besides that, in 
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order to test if the population mean ranks differ significantly between our two 
different populations (export and non-export firms), we run the Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test. Results show that the two populations mean ranks differ significantly 
at the 1% significance level.   
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Variable First Model Export firms (D_EI = 1) Non-Export firms (D_EI = 0) Wilcoxon 
Test Mean Median St Deviation Max Min Mean Median St deviation Max Min Mean Median St deviation Max Min 
Lev 0,272 0,222 0,226 1 0,000 0,248 0,224 0,187 0,993 0,000 0,278 0,237 0,235 1 0,000 *** 
EI - - - - - 0,340 0,260 0,296 1 0,01 - - - - - - 
Taxes 0,205 0,249 0,321 2,826 -3,64 0,205 0,250 0,326 2,804 -3,636 0,205 0,249 0,320 2,826 -3,64 *** 
Tangibility 0,302 0,218 0,285 1 0,000 0,233 0,200 0,185 0,968 0,000 0,320 0,226 0,304 1 0,000 *** 
Profitability 0,062 0,050 0,068 0,381 -0,197 0,085 0,072 0,073 0,381 -0,194 0,056 0,034 0,065 0,380 -0,197 *** 
FS 4,063 3,931 0,493 7,953 3,477 4,300 4,172 0,562 7,700 3,478 4,000 3,868 0,453 7,953 3,477 *** 
NDTS 0,026 0,018 0,027 0,413 0,000 0,032 0,025 0,027 0,365 0,000 0,024 0,015 0,027 0,413 0,000 *** 
IC 0,550 0,366 0,442 5,816 0,159 0,359 0,305 0,233 5,816 0,159 0,600 0,428 0,469 5,816 0,159 *** 
BR 18,968 16,879 5,221 93,732 7,677 16,915 15,905 4,374 93,732 7,677 19,509 19,198 5,291 93,732 7,677 *** 
IR 0,008 0,014 0,012 0,025 -0,005 0,008 -0,002 0,012 0,025 -0,005 0,009 0,014 0,012 0,025 -0,005 *** 
Number of           
observations 
131 286 27 368 103 918  
*** indicates that the population mean ranks differ significantly between export and non-export firms at the 1% significance level.  
Table 5 - Final table of the variables’ descriptive statistics. 
  
58 
 
 
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics analysis  
 
Table 5 shows that export firms have, on average, lower leverage than non-
export firms. The mean (median) export firms’ leverage of 24,8% (22,4%) is 
slightly lower than non-export firms’ mean (median) leverage of 27,8% (23,7%). 
The variable Leverage decreased between 2012 to 2017, starting with a 
level of leverage of 26% approximately in 2012 and ending with a level of 
leverage of 20%, as we can see in Graph 6. 
 
 
 
Graph 6 – Median leverage by year for All firms  
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As we can observe, for the exporter firms, the level of leverage has a slightly 
decrease during this period, but always with the debt levels rounding the 22%. 
 
 
Graph 7 – Exporters median leverage by year.      
For the Non-Export firms the trend is clearly descendent, with debt levels near 
27% in 2012, which decreased for a level slightly above 20%, in 2017. 
 
 
Graph 8 – Non-exporters firms median leverage by year  
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We thus can conclude that the debt level reduction was higher in the non-
export firms and that in the end of our period (2012-2017), exporter firms rely a 
little bit more in debt than the non-exporter firms. 
According to the Table 5 and Appendix A25, it is easy to see that only the export 
firms exhibit export intensity and, on average, they export 34% of their total sales. 
Considering now the variable taxes, we can affirm that the results are very 
similar between the two type of companies, with the mean exporter firm 
presenting a slightly higher marginal tax-rate than the non-export firm (25% 
versus 24,9%). However, there are different trends between the two group of 
firms. For the exporter firms the trend is clearly of decrease, while in the non-
exporter firms the trend is constant, there isn’t any significative difference during 
the study period. 
Tangibility and Profitability have inverse results when analyzed for both types 
of companies. On average, an export firm has less fixed tangible assets than a 
non-export firm (23,3% versus 32%); while, on average, export firms are more 
profitable than non-export firms (7,2% versus 3,4%). During the study’s period 
the tangibility trend is very similar for both groups; however, as mentioned 
before, asset tangibility is lower for exporter firms. In terms of the profitability 
variable, the trend is positive for both groups, however, is a little more 
pronounced for the exporter firms.  
Regarding the Firm Size, export firms tend to be larger, on average, than non-
export firms (4,3 versus 4). This variable presents a constant trend, across the 
period of study, for both groups.  
The mean (median) export firms’ Non-Debt Tax Shields of 3,2% (2,5%) is 
higher than non-export firms’ mean (median) of 2,4% (1,5%). During the period 
in analysis, for both groups, there is a similar slight descendent trend. 
                                               
25 Presents graphs with the evolution of every variables through the 2012-2017 period. 
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Having in mind that this variable, as well as Business Risk, is analyzed from 
an industry perspective, the mean (median) export firms’ market median 
leverage (Industry Conditions) of 35,9% (30,5%) is lower than non-export firms’ 
market median leverage of 60% (42,8%). When we analyze the exporter firms 
graph we cannot reach any trend conclusions, because there are a lot of variations 
and there are consecutive increases and decreases on the levels of this variable. 
However, when we look to the non-exporter firms’ graph, we can clearly observe 
a sharply decrease in the industry sector leverage from 60% in 2012 to 30% in 
2017.  
Similarly, the variable Business Risk presents, on average, a lower value of 
EBIT multiple (EV/EBIT) for the export firms (16,915), than for the non-export 
firms (19,509). This means that non-export firms are relatively overvalued. This 
happens because this EBIT multiple answers to the question “How much is a firm 
being valued per each euro of EBIT?”. For that reason, a company that is 
“potentially overvalued”, in theory, should not attract as many investors as a 
firm that is “on price” or “undervalued”. During the period in analysis, the 
business risk, have a slightly positive trend for both groups. This trend, have 
three possible explanations, or the EBIT has been decreasing from year to year 
which makes the multiple of EBIT higher, or the Enterprise Value has been 
increasing, or there is a combination of both (decreasing of EBIT and increasing 
of EV) that may lead to this positive trend.  
Finally, results show that Inflation Rate decreased significantly between 2012 
and 2014 (from 2,53% in 2012 to -0,153% in 2014), with a slightly decrease in 2015, 
a slightly increase in 2016, and a huge recover in 2017, with a final Inflation Rate 
of 1,97%. 
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4.4. Preliminary Analysis 
 
Table 7 will provide the relationships between the independent variables 
with leverage. Correlation analysis is the same as covariance analysis, however, 
the first, will solve the problem of the difficult interpretation of the results, 
because it will use the ratio between covariance and the standard deviation 
giving a result inside the interval [-1; 1]. 
 
Correlation  
 
Variables 
Leverage 
All Sectors Export Non-
Export 
Expected 
Relationship 
Taxes 0,0128 -0,0183 0,0196 + 
Tangibility  0,1895 0,2119 0,1819 + 
Profitability  -0,0313 -0,1471 0,0067 - 
FS -0,0374 -0,1171 -0,0013 + 
NDTS 0,0916 0,0783 0,1026 - 
IC 0,0147 -0,0029 0,0034 + 
BR -0,0344 -0,0080 -0,0530 - 
IR 0,0160 0,0020 0,0188 - 
EI -0,0389 -0,0011 - - 
Table 6 - Correlation table and the expected impact on the independent variable for each variable. 
 
Our results show that: (i) for export firms, while there is a positive relationship 
between leverage and Tangibility, NDTS and Inflation Rate; Taxes, Profitability, 
FS, IC, BR and Export Intensity seem to affect firms’ leverage negatively.; and (ii) 
non-export firms’ leverage is positively affected by Taxes, Tangibility, 
Profitability, NDTS, IC and Inflation Rate, while FS and BR affect negatively. 
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This preliminary analysis is important to understand the relationship between 
each of the independent/control variables with the dependent variable, however 
this relationship does not have to do with our final answer to the research 
question. Pearson’s correlation only shows us the independent relation between 
the variables, does not show us the results whenever all the other variables that 
explains the dependent variable are correlated with the independent variables. 
For that reason, we will use a regression analysis in the further chapters. 
 
4.5.  Methodology 
 
Our sample comprises a set of 45,147 firms, with data available for the 
2012-2017 period (6 years). Although our model is also composed by cross-
section and time-series variables, the analysis of the financial decisions will be 
performed in a panel-data format.  
A panel data (or longitudinal data) set consists of a time series for each 
cross-sectional member in the data set [Wooldridge (2012)]. The panel data 
analysis allows us to explain the heterogeneity between firms and industries, as 
well as model the dynamic effects that are not visible when using cross-section 
[Greene (2012)].  
In our model we used industry fixed-effects26, which emerge from the 
assumption that there are omitted variables/effects that are correlated with our 
explanatory variables [Greene (2012)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
26 Frank and Goyal (2009) say that is important to use fixed-effects in the regression models. 
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So, the model that will be used to study the Spanish non-listed firms’ financing 
decisions by export and non-export firms, will be the following: 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
• i: firm observation (i=1, 2, …,45 147) 
• t: year observation (t=2012, 2013, …, 2017)  
• j: industry observation (j=1, 2, …,18) 
• i, t: firm-year observation (i,t=131 286) 
• j, i: industry-firm observation (j,i=45 147)  
• Lev: Leverage  
• DExp: Dummy variable set equal to 1 if the observation i,t is related to an 
export firm and 0, otherwise.  
• 𝛾𝑗 Code j,i: FE (fixed-effect) estimator which takes the value 1 wherever a 
firm i belongs to the industry j and that industry j are the same as the 𝛾j 
industry, and 0 otherwise.  
• FS: Firm Size 
• NDTS: Non-Debt Tax Shields 
• IC: Industry Conditions 
• BR: Business Risk 
• IR: Inflation Rate  
 
 
 
Levi,t = β0 + β1 DExpi,t +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒17𝑗=1 j,i + β2 Taxesi,t + β3 Tangibilityi,t +  
Β4 Profitabilityi,t + β5 FSi,t + β6 NDTSi,t + β7 ICi,t + β8 BRi,t + β9 IRt + εi,t 
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Chapter 5 
  
5. Regression results and Deviations from the 
literature  
5.1. Regression Results  
 
Before starting to analyze the regression results, we must check if all the 
statistic assumptions are in line with our model. According to Greene (2012), 
multicollinearity27, endogeneity28 and heteroskedasticity29 problems must be 
verified before any analysis.  
Our use of fixed-effects will solve the endogeneity problem, since the purpose 
of it is to control the omitted variables in the error term that are correlated with 
the independent variables [Greene (2012)].  
In order to test the multicollinearity assumption, we have made the VIF30 test. 
According to O’Brien (2007), a common rule says that a VIF higher than 10 is 
considered high and in those cases, there are multicollinearity. As we can observe 
in the table 8, there isn’t any value higher than 1,46, and for that reason we can 
assume that there isn´t any multicollinearity problems. 
 
 
                                               
27 Multicollinearity occurs when the model’s explanatory variables are perfectly or almost 
perfectly colinear with each other. 
28 Endogeneity occurs when one, or more, of the explanatory variables used in the model are 
correlated with the error term of the model. 
29 Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the error is different across observations, or 
if the error is correlated across observations. 
30 Variance Inflation Factor, is a test used to detects multicollinearity in regression analysis. 
The results of this test have a minimum value of 1. 
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Variable VIF 
EI 1,19 
Taxes 1,01 
Tangibility 1,18 
Profitability 1,35 
FS 1,09 
NDTS 1,46 
IC 1,14 
BR 1,12 
IR 1,02 
Table 7 – VIF test 
 
In order to test the heteroskedasticity assumption, we have estimated the 
regression model under a robust estimation which will allow us to compute a 
fixed-effect regression without heteroskedasticity issues [Green (2012)]. 
After the verification of all the assumptions, we will now analyze the 
impact of the independent variables in the dependent variable. The Table 9 
presents the results of the model estimation. 
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Variables Industry fixed-effects 
First model (1) Exporters (2) Non-Exporters 
(3) 
Intercept 0,260 
(0,048) 
0,390*** 
(0,042) 
0,213*** 
(0,040) 
Exporters -0,009*** 
(0,002) 
  
Export Intensity   0,028*** 
(0,04) 
 
Taxes 0,008*** 
(0,002) 
-0,008** 
(0,003) 
0,013*** 
(0,002) 
Tangibility 0,138*** 
(0,003) 
0,226*** 
(0,008) 
0,134*** 
(0,003) 
Profitability -0,312*** 
(0,010) 
-0,496*** 
(0,016) 
-0,245*** 
(0,012) 
Firm Size -0,006*** 
(0,001) 
-0,035*** 
(0,002) 
-0,005*** 
(0,002) 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0,644*** 
(0,028) 
0,236*** 
(0,055) 
0,650*** 
(0,034) 
Industry 
Conditions 
0,032*** 
(0,003) 
-0,007 
(0,009) 
-0,035*** 
(0,003) 
Business Risk -0,001*** 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
-0,001*** 
(0,000) 
Inflation Rate 0,074 
(0,052) 
-0,228** 
(0,093) 
0,099 
(0,062) 
Industry Fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0,0597 0,1027 0,0558 
Overall F-Test 294,82*** 124,72*** 224,22*** 
Number of 
observations 
131 286 27 368 103 918 
***, **, * denotes significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors using panel data methodology. Model (1) presents the results of the estimation for both types of firms (Exporter and Non-
Exporter). Model 2 and 3 presents the results of the estimation for Exporter firms and Non-Exporter firms respectively. 
Table 8 – Regression results (obtained by the Stata Software) 
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Taking into consideration the estimation results presented above, the 
Industry fixed-effect regression suggest that in case of the Model 1 (both export 
and non-export firms), the variables Profitability, Firm Size and Business Risk 
have a negative impact on the dependent variable (Leverage). On the other hand, 
the variables Taxes, Tangibility, Non-Det Tax Shields and Industry Conditions 
have a positive impact on the dependent variable. The variable Inflation Rate has 
an insignificant impact on Leverage. Looking deeply into our dummy variable 
(Exporters), we are able to draw that, since this variable is a dummy variable, the 
export firms’ leverage is 0,9 percentage points lower, holding all other 
determinants constant (observed and non-observed), when compared to the non-
exporter firms. It is also important to note that the variables Tangibility, 
Profitability and NDTS are the ones with a higher impact on the Leverage. 
However, when we separate the sample between export and non-export 
firms and analyze their estimation results separately (Model 2 and Model 3), the 
results that we obtain are slightly different.  
In the Model 2 (export firms), the variables Export Intensity, Tangibility 
and Non-Debt Tax Shields have a positive impact in the dependent variable. On 
the other hand, the variables Taxes, Profitability, Firm Size and Inflation Rate 
have a negative impact on Leverage. In this case, Industry Conditions and 
Business risk have both an insignificant impact on the Leverage. Once again, it is 
important to notice that, among the exporter firms, the higher the Export 
Intensity, the higher will be the Leverage level. 
In the Model 3 (non-export firms), the variables Taxes, Tangibility and 
Non-Debt Tax Shields have a positive impact on the dependent variable. In 
contrast, the variables Profitability, Firm Size, Industry Conditions and Business 
Risk have a negative impact on the Leverage. Inflation Rate has an insignificant 
impact on the Leverage. In this Model we do not have estimation results for the 
69 
 
variable Export Intensity, because the Non-export firms does not have export 
value.  
The two main statistics used in order to analyze a regression model’s fit 
are the coefficient of determination and the overall F-test. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) is the proportion of the dependent variable explained by the 
regression model31, basically it indicates the goodness of fit of the model and can 
have values between the interval [0;1] [Greene (2012)]. The overall F-test 
evaluates the power of the regression model. The model will not have any power 
if the dependent variable is not related to any of the independent/explanatory 
variables. 
The estimation results obtained by our industry fixed-effect regression 
model, for our three regression models (all sectors, export firms and non-export 
firms), have explanatory power (the F-test is significant for a significance level of 
1%). However, as they do not have a higher R2, we decided to re-estimate the 
same model using firm fixed-effects (see Appendix D for more details).  
In the firm fixed-effects case, the coefficient of determination becomes very 
high for the three regression models (all sectors, export firms and non-export 
firms), approximately 89%, 85% and 90%, respectively, and the model has, once 
again,  explanatory power (the F-test is significant for a significance level of 1%). 
So, why don’t we use only the Firm fixed-effects model if it provides us a more 
explicative model (higher R2)? We cannot do that, because since our Export 
Intensity variable is a Dummy variable which takes the value 0 if it relates to a 
non-export firm and 1 otherwise, if we have used firm fixed-effects this variable 
would have to be eliminated32. For that reason, we present on Appendix D, only 
an hypotetical regression of Firm fixed-effects and show that the coefficients that 
                                               
31 Mathematically speaking, is the proportion of the total variance of the dependent variable 
that is explained by the regression model. 
32 since our variable export intensity does not vary between firm observations (one firm will 
have the same export intensity for the six years in study), and the aim of fixed-effects is to “catch” 
and solve all the things that are constant, this variable would have been dropped. 
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we achieve on doing so are very similar to the ones that we achieve when we 
regress our estimation model through industry fixed-effects.  
After the analysis of the hypothetical firm fixed-effects regression model, 
we can observe that all the estimation results that are statistically significative are 
the same, except in the Firm Size variable where the three different regression 
models (all firms, export-firms and non-export-firms) have negative coefficients, 
while they are positive in the industry fixed-effects models. Besides that, only the 
variable Industry Conditions for the non-export firms have a different estimation 
coefficient (-0,035 in the Industry fixed-effects model and 0,035 in the firm fixed-
effects model). 
From the presented results we can conclude that for the Model(1) and 
Model(2) two the variable export is statistically significative, however different 
between them. For the Model(1), the estimation coefficient is (-0,009), presenting 
a negative relationship between export and firms’ leverage, like Chen and Yu 
(2011) argued. However, when we only look for export companies (Model 2), in 
line with Silva and Pinto (2018), there is a positive relationship between export 
intensity and firm’s leverage. 
 
5.2. Deviations from the literature  
 
Now that we know the estimation results of our regression model, it is 
important to analyze and confirm if there are any deviations from the literature. 
To do so, we will have three tables, one for each model (all firms, export firms 
and non-export firms), that will be divided by determinants, expeted signal, 
findings and significance test (if is significanty at the 5% level).  
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Model  Determinant Expected 
signal 
Findings Significance 
 
 
 
 
All firms 
model (1) 
Taxes + + Significant 
Tangibility + + Significant 
Profitability - - Significant 
Firm Size + - Significant 
Non-Debt Tax Shields - + Significant 
Industry Conditions + + Significant 
Business Risk - - Significant 
Inflation Rate - + Insignificant 
Export Intensity - - Significant 
Table 9 - Expected signal, findings and individual significance tests for the model (1). 
There are only two significant deviations from the existing literature in the 
first model (All firms model).  
The fourth hypothesis, which says that larger firms rely more on debt 
[Bradley et al. (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris 
and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal (2009)) is not confirmed in model (1). 
Moreover, results do not corroborate the fifth hypothesis, which says that firms 
with higher non-debt tax shields have less leverage [DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), Harris and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal (2009)]. In addition, as we 
find an insignifincat relationship between inflation rate and leverage, results do 
not seem to corroborate ninth hypothesis.  
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Model  Determinant Expected 
signal 
Findings Significance 
 
 
 
 
Export firms  
model (2) 
Taxes + - Significant 
Tangibility + + Significant 
Profitability - - Significant 
Firm Size + - Significant 
Non-Debt Tax Shields - + Significant 
Industry Conditions + - Insignificant 
Business Risk - + Insignificant 
Inflation Rate - - Significant 
Export Intensity - + Significant 
Table 10 - Expected signal, findings and individual significance tests for the model (2). 
 
In this model, there are four significant deviations from the 
literature.  
The first hypothesis, which says that there is a positive relation between 
corporate taxes and leverage [Modigliani and Miller (1963), Baxter (1967), Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973) and Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011)], is not 
confirmed by the model (2). The fourth and the fifth hypothesis are also not 
confirmed by the model (2). Lastly, the tenth hypothesis, which says that there is 
a negative relation between export intensity and leverage [Chen and Yu (2011)], 
is not confirmed by the model (2), however, is in line with Silva and Pinto (2018). 
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Model  Determinant Expected 
signal 
Findings Significance 
 
 
 
Non-export 
firms  model 
(3) 
Taxes + + Significant 
Tangibility + + Significant 
Profitability - - Significant 
Firm Size + - Significant 
Non-Debt Tax Shields - + Significant 
Industry Conditions + - Significant 
Business Risk - - Significant 
Inflation Rate - + Insignificant 
Table 11 - Expected signal, findings and individual significance tests for the model (3). 
 
In this model, there are three significant deviations from the existent 
literature. 
The fourth and fifth hypothesis, once again, are not confirmed by the 
model (3). The sixth hypothesis, which says that there is a positive relation 
between industry leverage and firm’s leverage [Hovakimian (2001), Flannery and 
Ragan (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2009)], is also not confirmed by the model 
(3). In addition, as we find an insignifincat relationship between inflation rate 
and leverage, results do not seem to corroborate ninth hypothesis.  
 There are three possible reasons that may have led to these deviations in 
the results. First, we studied unlisted firms, when most of the studies are 
performed through listed firms. Secondly, our study period can be considered a 
recovery period from the financial and European sovereign debt crisis, which 
may lead to some deviations in the normal forms of corporate action. Third, we 
use some determinant proxies that were not in the literature, due to the 
differences of the Spanish accountability and the difficulty in finding the same 
accounting items that the authors use and it may have lead to different findings.  
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5.3. Model with Growth Opportunities 
 
Table 13 will present the estimation results if the Growth Opportunities 
variable would had been included in our model. This variable was not included 
in the baseline model, because it would sharply decrease our number of 
observations. 
Variables Model in study plus GO 
First model (4) Exporters (5) Non-Exporters 
(6) 
Intercept 0,299*** 
(0,041) 
0,219*** 
(0,027) 
0,243*** 
(0,041) 
Exporters  -0,005*** 
(0,002) 
  
Export Intensity  0,034*** 
(0,004) 
 
Taxes 0,007*** 
(0,002) 
-0,008** 
(0,004) 
0,013*** 
(0,003) 
Tangibility 0,147*** 
(0,004) 
0,198*** 
(0,009) 
0,142*** 
(0,004) 
Profitability -0,399*** 
(0,012) 
-0,521*** 
(0,017) 
-0,344*** 
(0,016) 
Growth Opportunities 0,077*** 
(0,012) 
0,225*** 
(0,025) 
0,027* 
(0,014) 
Firm Size -0,012*** 
(0,002) 
-0,038*** 
(0,002) 
-0,000 
(0,002) 
Non-Debt Tax 
Shield 
0,677*** 
(0,039) 
0,642*** 
(0,072) 
0,608*** 
(0,047) 
Industry Conditions  0,020*** 
(0,005) 
0,000 
(0,009) 
0,022*** 
(0,005) 
Business Risk  -0,001*** 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
-0,001*** 
(0,000) 
Inflation Rate 0,019 
(0,065) 
-0,217** 
(0,101) 
0,074 
(0,083) 
Industry Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
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R squared 0,0644 0,1095 0,0549 
Overall F-Test 182,02*** 105,43*** 112,02*** 
Number of observations 73 837 22 408 51 429 
Table 12 - Regression results with the inclusion of the variable Growth Opportunities (obtained by the Stata 
software). 
***, **, * denotes significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors using panel data methodology. Model (1) presents the results of the estimation, plus the variable Growth Opportunities, 
for both types of firms (Exporter and Non-Exporter). Model 2 and 3 presents the results of the estimation, also plus the variable Growth 
Opportunities, for Exporter firms and Non-Exporter firms respectively. 
 
It is possible to conclude that the inclusion of the Growth Opportunities did 
not change our results, because none of the statistically significant variables 
changed their estimation results. We add an independent/explanatory variable 
to our regression model and still the estimation results are the same, which means 
that our regression model is solid and consistent. 
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Conclusion  
The main purpose of this study is to answer to the following research 
questions: (i) What are the differences in the financing decisions between non-
listed Spanish exporter and non-exporter firms? (ii) What is the impact of Export 
Intensity in the non-listed Spanish firms’ leverage? 
To answer our research questions, was collected data for 45 147 unlisted 
Spanish firms belonging to export and non-export sectors during the 2012-2017 
period. We use a panel data econometric model to answer to these questions. 
According to the extant literature, nine determinants were used: Taxes, 
Tangibility, Profitability, Firm Size, Non-Debt Tax Shields, Industry Conditions, 
Business Risk, Inflation Rate and Export Intensity. Then we performed a 
robustness check by adding the Growth Opportunities to our model, because the 
inclusion of this variable would drastically decrease our number of observations. 
The regression results show differences between the export and non-export 
firms, and for that reason we can conclude that the factors that influence non-
listed Spanish export and non-export firms’ leverage are different. 
According to the results, in the first model (All firms), the effect of Taxes, 
Tangibility and Industry Conditions are in line with the extant literature, with a 
positive relationship with Leverage. Also, the impact of Profitability, Business 
Risk and Export Intensity on leverage level is in line with the literature, 
presenting a negative impact. Contrary to previous empirical literature, Firm Size 
presents a negative impact, while Non-Debt Tax Shields presents a positive 
impact. Inflation Rate is not significant in this model. 
According to the results for Export firms only, the impact of Tangibility, 
Profitability and Inflation Rate on leverage is in line with the literature, with a 
positive relationship between Tangibility and Leverage, and a negative 
relationship between Profitability and Inflation Rate and Leverage. The 
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remaining are not in line with the extant literature, being the impact of both 
Industry Conditions and Business Risk insignificant.  
In the third model (Non-export firms), the effect of Taxes, Tangibility, 
Profitability and Business Risk on leverage level is in line with the extant 
literature, with the first two having a positive relationship with leverage and the 
other two a negative relationship. Firm Size, Non-Debt Tax Shields and Industry 
Conditions have different results from what we expected from the extant 
literature and Inflation Rate is not significant. 
In the model with Growth Opportunities, the results are the same for all the 
variables, which show that our model is robust. 
Regarding our both research questions, we find that export firms have a lower 
leverage level than non-export firms. In addition, export intensity affects 
positively a firm’s leverage.  
During this study there were a lot of challenges faced and successfully 
overtake. The differences between Spain accountability and the financial items 
used by extant literature was one of them. Furthermore, the fact that we studied 
unlisted firms, made it more difficult to obtain financial data, since the firms in 
study are private, and for that reason, the available information led to a huge 
drop in the initial observations.  
Our sample begins in a year in which Spain was helped by the International 
Monetary Fund with 100 thousand million euros, due to the financial crisis. This 
fact may have dissembled the firm’s behavior, mainly when we are talking about 
financing decisions. In the future, it would be interesting if a resembling study it 
is done for a period without the financial crisis factor in order to see if the results 
are similar. Extend this study to more countries in Europe, namely France and 
Germany, would create a very strong empiric basis regarding the study of the 
differences in financing decisions between export and non-export firms. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A - Median evolution of all independent variables during the 2012-
2017 period 
 
 
Output: Stata software. Note that the graph above is only for the export firms, since the non-export firms do not have 
Export Intensity. 
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Appendix B – Correlation Tables 
Correlation for the first model (all firms model) 
Variables  Lev  EI Taxes Tangibility Profitability  FS NDTS IC BR IR 
Lev 1,000          
EI -0,0389 1,000         
Taxes 0,0128 -0,0101 1,000        
Tangibility 0,1895 -0,0830 0,0166 1,000       
Profitability  -0,0313 0,1486 0,0446 0,1438 1,000      
FS -0,0374 0,2163 -0,0474 -0,1464 0,0220 1,000     
NDTS 0,0916 0,0899 -0,0035 0,3325 0,4862 -0,0082 1,000    
IC 0,0147 -0,1594 -0,0065 0,0311 -0,1371 0,0160 -0,1155 1,000   
BR -0,0344 -0,1451 -0,0315 0,0767 -0,0546 -0,0049 -0,0499 0,2629 1,000  
IR 0,0160 -0,0012 0,0092 0,0112 -0,0196 -0,0055 0,0153 0,0844 -0,0789 1,000 
 
 
Correlation for the second model (export firms’ model) 
Variables  Lev  EI Taxes Tangibility Profitability  FS NDTS IC BR IR 
Lev 1,000          
EI -0,0011 1,000         
Taxes -0,0183 -0,0319 1,000        
Tangibility 0,2119 0,0234 -0,0117 1,000       
Profitability  -0,1471 0,0754 0,0448 0,1579 1,000      
FS -0,1171 0,1089 -0,0449 -0,0843 -0,0500 1,000     
NDTS 0,0783 0,0453 -0,0316 0,5240 0,3292 -0,0670 1,000    
IC -0,0029 -0,0019 -0,0140 0,0109 -0,0297 0,0844 0,0176 1,000   
BR -0,0080 -0,0025 -0,0188 -0,0676 -0,0128 0,0716 0,0269 0,0474 1,000  
IR 0,0020 0,0040 -0,0016 0,0216 -0,0154 -0,0154 0,0231 -0,0827 -0,0581 1,000 
 
92 
 
 
Correlation for the third model (non-export firms’ model) 
Variables  Lev  EI Taxes Tangibility Profitability  FS NDTS IC BR IR 
Lev 1,000          
EI           
Taxes 0,0196  1,000        
Tangibility 0,1819  0,0218 1,000       
Profitability  0,0067  0,0454 0,1754 1,000      
FS -0,0013  -0,0506 -0,1332 -0,0109 1,000     
NDTS 0,1026  0,0039 0,3282 0,5222 -0,0256 1,000    
IC 0,0034  -0,0059 0,0034 -0,1183 0,0781 -0,1123 1,000   
BR -0,0530  -0,0351 0,0697 -0,0229 -0,0417 -0,0417 0,2508 1,000  
IR 0,0188  0,0121 0,0093 -0,0118 -0,0013 0,0139 0,1103 -0,0866 1,000 
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Appendix C – Regression results for the same model, however computed 
through firm fixed-effects instead of industry fixed-effects 
 
Variables Firm Fixed-effects 
First model (4) Exporters (5) Non-Exporters (6) 
Intercept -0,475*** 
(0,022) 
-0,451*** 
(0,038) 
-0,487*** 
(0,027) 
Taxes 0,001 
(0,001) 
0,000 
(0,002) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
Tangibility 0,132*** 
(0,006) 
0,240*** 
(0,014) 
0,114*** 
(0,006) 
Profitability -0,306*** 
(0,008) 
-0,337*** 
(0,015) 
-0,289*** 
(0,010) 
Firm Size 0,179*** 
(0,005) 
0,157*** 
(0,009) 
0,188*** 
(0,007) 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0,186*** 
(0,035) 
0,162** 
(0,066) 
0,162*** 
(0,042) 
MDE 0,032*** 
(0,001) 
-0,002 
(0,004) 
0,035*** 
(0,001) 
EVE -0,001*** 
(0,000) 
-0,001*** 
(0,000) 
-0,002*** 
(0,000) 
Inflation Rate 0,185*** 
(0,020) 
0,041 
(0,042) 
0,182*** 
(0,027) 
Firm Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R squared 0,8911 0,8496 0,8981 
Overall F-Test 487,27*** 137,52*** 371,24*** 
Number of observations 131 286 27 368 103 918 
***, **, * denotes significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors using panel data methodology. 
